Abstract-In multihop wireless networks (MWNs), the mobile nodes usually act as routers to relay other nodes' packets to enable new applications and enhance network performance and deployment. However, selfish nodes may not cooperate and make use of the cooperative nodes to relay their packets, which has a negative effect on network fairness, security, and performance. Incentive systems implement micropayment in the network to stimulate the selfish nodes to cooperate. However, micropayment schemes have originally been proposed for Web-based applications; therefore, a practical incentive system should consider the differences between Web-based applications and cooperation stimulation. In this paper, first, these differences are investigated, and a payment model is developed for the efficient implementation of micropayment in MWNs. Second, based on the developed payment model, an incentive system is proposed to stimulate the nodes' cooperation in MWNs. Third, a reactive receipt submission mechanism is proposed to reduce the number of submitted receipts and protect against collusion attacks. Extensive analysis and simulations demonstrate that our incentive system can secure the payment and reduce the overhead of storing, submitting, and processing payment receipts significantly, which can improve the system's practicality due to the high frequency of low-value payment transactions.
Most existing routing protocols assume that the nodes of MWN are willing to relay other nodes' packets. This assumption is reasonable in disaster recovery and military applications because the nodes belong to a single authority and pursue a common goal, but it may not hold for civilian applications, where the nodes are autonomous and aim to maximize their welfare. Although proper network operation requires the nodes to collaborate, collaboration consumes their valuable resources, such as energy and computing power, which stimulates the nodes to behave selfishly. Therefore, in civilian applications, selfish nodes are not voluntarily interested in cooperation without sufficient incentive and make use of the cooperative nodes to relay their packets, which has a negative effect on network fairness, performance, and security. The fairness issue arises when selfish nodes take advantage of the cooperative nodes without any contribution to the network, and the cooperative nodes are unfairly overloaded because the network traffic is concentrated through them. The selfish behavior also significantly degrades the network performance, which may result in failure of the multihop communication [6] , [7] .
Reputation-based and incentive systems [8] , [9] have been proposed to enforce and stimulate node cooperation, respectively. In reputation-based systems, each network node usually monitors the transmissions of its neighbors to make sure that the neighbors forward the others' traffic, and thus, selfish nodes can be identified and punished. In incentive systems, forwarding other nodes' packets is a service and not an obligation, so the communicating nodes pay credits (or virtual currency) to the intermediate nodes to relay their packets. However, reputationbased systems [10] , [11] suffer from essential problems that may discourage implementing them practically. First, to monitor the transmissions of its neighbors, a network node usually works in the promiscuous mode that is not efficient because the node uses the full power transmission instead of adapting the transmission power according to the distance separating the transmitter and the receiver [12] . Furthermore, the directional antennas [13] that can improve the network capacity due to reducing the interference area make monitoring difficult. Second, reputation-based systems do not achieve fairness because the high-contribution nodes are not compensated, and the nodes are punished when they do not cooperate, no matter how they have previously contributed to the network. For example, although the nodes situated at the network center relay more packets than those at the periphery, they are not compensated. Third, these systems suffer from unreliable detection of the selfish nodes and false accusation of the honest nodes because it is difficult to differentiate between a node's unwillingness and incapability to cooperate, e.g., due to low resources or network congestion.
0018-9545/$26.00 © 2010 IEEE Moreover, the assumption that the transmitted packets by a node can be received by all the nodes in its neighborhood cannot be ensured, e.g., due to packet collision [14] . Finally, reputation-based systems have not considered the possibility that selfish nodes can collude with each other to boost their reputations to maximize their welfare. Incentive systems are better for MWNs because, in addition to cooperation stimulation, the systems can achieve fairness by charging or rewarding credits to balance between a node's contributions and benefits. A node's contribution can be relaying other nodes' packets or paying credits, whereas a node's benefit can be relaying its packets or earning credits. Moreover, since the network nodes pay for relaying their packets, incentive systems can discourage resource exhaustion attack, where malicious nodes exchange bogus packets to exhaust the intermediate nodes' resources. Incentive systems can also be used for charging future services of mobile networks [15] , [16] because communication sessions may occur without involving an infrastructure, and mobile nodes may roam among different foreign networks. In other words, by using an incentive system, the network nodes can pay all parties involved in its communication without contacting distant home location registers.
However, the practicality of the existing incentive systems is questionable because they impose significant overhead cost. Micropayment schemes [17] [18] [19] are electronic payment schemes for frequent and low-value payments. The schemes were originally designed for Internet electronic commerce applications to take advantage of the high volume of viewers by offering content for low price. Examples of the applications include buying data or news, listening to a song, playing an online game, and reading an article in a journal [20] . To efficiently implement such scheme in MWNs, the differences between Webbased applications and cooperation stimulation should be taken into account. These differences are summarized in Table I. For Web-based applications, a transaction usually contains one customer and one merchant, and the merchants' number is low, and their identities are known before the transaction is held. For cooperation stimulation, each transaction usually contains two customers (the source and the destination nodes) and multiple merchants (the intermediate nodes), the merchants' number is large because any network node can work as a merchant (or packet relay), and the merchants' identities are known only at the transaction (session) time due to the nodes' mobility. Moreover, the relation between a customer and a merchant is usually short due to the network's dynamic topology. The nodes are involved in low-value transactions very frequently because once a route is broken, which is frequently due to the nodes' mobility and channel impairment, a new transaction should be held to reestablish the route. In wireless networks, the nodes have low resources, such as energy and storage area, as compared with the computers' resources in Web-based applications. Although security is important in all payment applications, attacks can be launched easier in Webbased applications because it is easier to launch attacks across the Internet than tampering devices.
In this paper, first, we develop a payment model that takes into account the features of cooperation stimulation, which can improve the practical implementation of micropayment in MWNs. Second, based on the developed payment model, we propose a practical incentive system (PIS) to stimulate the nodes' cooperation in MWN. Since the communication sessions may occur without involving an infrastructure, the communicating nodes issue digital receipts to the intermediate nodes, which submit the receipts to the accounting center (AC) to claim their payment. The conclusive point for the practical implementation of incentive systems is the receipts' submission and process overhead due to the high frequency of low-value transactions. In other words, submitting a large number of receipts implies significant communication and computation overhead and implementation difficulty because the cost of receipt submission and process may exceed the transaction value. Therefore, in our incentive system, instead of generating a receipt per packet or group of packets, one fixed-size receipt is generated per session regardless of the number of transmitted packets. Moreover, a receipt size can significantly be reduced by attaching the hash of the nodes' signatures instead of the signatures, and different receipts can be aggregated together to a smaller size receipt.
Our third contribution is proposing a reactive receipt submission mechanism to reduce the number of submitted and processed receipts and to protect against collusion attacks. In our incentive system, a receipt contains payment data for all the intermediate nodes; therefore, it is sufficient to submit one copy to clear the receipt. However, it is not secure to trust one node to submit the receipt because it may collude with the communicating nodes (payers) in order to not submit the receipt to increase their welfare. The mechanism is a reactive one because unlike the Preventive mechanism [21] , which requires submitting a large number of redundant receipts to fail the collusion attacks, our mechanism submits an incomparable number of redundant receipts to identify the colluding nodes, and the number of unsubmitted receipts can be limited probabilistically. Extensive analysis and simulations demonstrate that our incentive system can secure the payment and significantly reduce the number of submitted and processed receipts, particularly at high packettransmission rate, which can improve the system's practicality due to the high frequency of low-value transactions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related work. Section III presents the system models. Section IV proposes our incentive system. Security analysis and performance evaluation are provided in Sections V and VI, respectively, followed by conclusion in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The existing incentive systems can be classified into two categories: 1) tamper-proof device (TPD) and 2) central-bankbased systems. In TPD-based incentive systems [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , a TPD is installed in each device to manage its credit account and secure its operation. In central-bank-based incentive systems [21] , [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] , a centralized unit called the AC stores and manages the nodes' accounts.
In Nuglets [22] , the self-generated and forwarding packets are passed to the node's TPD to decrease and increase its credit account, respectively. Two payment models, called the packet purse model (PPM) and the packet trade model (PTM), have been proposed. In the PPM, the source node pays for relaying its packets by loading some credits in each packet before sending it, each forwarding node acquires the amount of credits that cover the packet's forwarding cost, and the packet is dropped if it runs out of credits. In the PTM, each intermediate node runs auctions to sell the session packets to the following node on the route, and the destination node pays the total cost. In secure incentive protocol [23] , after receiving a packet, the destination node sends a payment RECEIPT packet to the source node to issue a REWARD packet, which increments the credit counters of the intermediate nodes. In cooperation and accounting strategy for hybrid wireless networks (CASHnet) [24] , [25] , for each transmitted packet, the source node's traffic-credit account stored in the node is charged, and a signature is attached. Upon receiving the packet, the destination node's traffic-credit account is also charged, and a digitally signed ACK packet is sent back to increase the helper-credit accounts of the intermediate nodes. Users regularly visit service points to buy traffic credits for real money and/or convert helper credits to traffic credits.
Centralized-bank-based incentive systems can be classified into coin-and receipt-based systems. In coin-based incentive systems [27] , a network node buys electronic coins from the AC before being involved in a session to pay for relaying its packets. In receipt-based incentive systems [21] , [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] , the communicating nodes issue receipts (or payment proofs) to the intermediate nodes that submit the receipts to the AC to update their accounts, i.e., a network node communicates first and pays later. In [27] , each node on a communication session buys packets from the upstream node and sells them to the downstream node. The packets' buyer and seller contact the AC to get deposited coins and submit the coins to claim the payment, respectively; therefore, the session's nodes contact the AC in each session.
In [28] , the source node appends a token to each transmitted packet, and each intermediate node uses its secret key to check whether the token corresponds to a winning ticket. Winning tickets are submitted to the AC to reward the winning nodes. In a security flaw, colluders can collect and exchange tokens to be checked in each node to steal credits. Since the nodes are rewarded only for winning tickets, fairness issue arises when a node is not adequately compensated for its cooperation. In our earlier work [29] , instead of submitting payment receipts to the AC, each node submits a smaller size activity report containing its alleged charges and rewards in different sessions, and the AC uses a reputation system to identify the cheating nodes. However, due to the nature of the reputation systems, some honest nodes may falsely be identified as cheaters, and colluding nodes may manage to steal credits. In [30] , an incentive system has been proposed for a hybrid ad hoc network, but the base station is involved in every communication session, which may lead to suboptimal routes when the communicating nodes reside in the same cell.
In Sprite [31] , the source node signs the full path identities and appends its signature to each transmitted message. In Sprite and an enforceable incentive scheme for wireless networks using network coding (INPAC) [32] , the intermediate and destination nodes compose receipts and submit them to the AC to claim the payment. In Express [33] , the source node generates a hash chain for every intermediate node ID K by iteratively hashing random value (V S ) S times to obtain a final hash value V 0 . The source node commits to the hash chain by digitally signing V 0 and sending the signature to ID K . Each time ID K relays a packet, the source node releases the preimage of the last sent hash value, where V 1 is released first, V 2 second, and so on. Payment nonrepudiation is achievable because the hash function is one way, i.e., only the source node can generate the hash chain. The source, intermediate, and destination nodes compose receipts and submit them to the AC. However, each node has to generate and store a large number of hash chains due to the large number of probable relays (P2 in Table I ). In Sprite, INPAC, and Express, only the source node pays, regardless of how the destination node benefits from the communication. Moreover, since an intermediate node is rewarded for every successfully relayed packet even if it does not reach the destination, all the session nodes submit the receipts because a node's packet forwarding is considered successful if its next node on the path reports a valid receipt. We call this receipt submission mechanism All-Submitters because all the intermediate nodes submit all the receipts. In Sprite, INPAC and Express, significant communication and computation overhead are implied due to submitting and processing a large number of receipts, because a receipt is generated per packet and submitted by all the nodes on the session.
In [34] , an incentive system has been proposed for an ad hoc network that is used to connect the nodes to the Internet. For each packet, the source node appends a signature to the full path identities, and the destination node signs a receipt and sends it to the last intermediate node to submit to the AC. Since a receipt contains payment data for all the intermediate nodes, one copy of the receipt is submitted to claim the payment for all the intermediate nodes, which we call the One-Submitter receipt submission mechanism. However, the proposed system does not handle collusion attacks, e.g., the communicating nodes can communicate freely, and the intermediate nodes are not rewarded when the last intermediate node colludes with the payers in order to not submit the receipts.
In double signature cheque mechanism (DSC) [21] , instead of generating a hash chain for each intermediate node like Express, one hash chain of size S is generated to pay for all the intermediate nodes on a session. A receipt contains payment data for all the intermediate nodes and at most S packets. A receipt for X packets contains the root hash value (V 0 ) and the last released hash value (V X−1 ). The number of transmitted packets is computed from the number of hashing operations to map V X−1 to V 0 . A new receipt is generated when S packets are sent or when the route is broken. Furthermore, since a receipt contains payment data for all the intermediate nodes, a Preventive receipt submission mechanism has been proposed to reduce the number of submitted receipts and prevent a collusion attack. In this mechanism, each intermediate node submits a number of randomly chosen receipts that guarantee submitting a minimum number of unrepeated receipts probabilistically. The mechanism is a preventive mechanism because it aims to prevent the effectiveness of the collusion attack by submitting redundant receipts, i.e., even if some colluding nodes do not submit the receipts, they may be submitted by other nodes; therefore, a minimum number of unrepeated receipts can be submitted under a collusion attack. Increasing the number of submitted receipts by each node increases the robustness against a collusion attack but with additional redundant receipts.
III. SYSTEM MODELS

A. Network and Communication Models
The considered MWN includes AC, mobile nodes, and base stations in some types of MWNs. The AC stores and manages the nodes' credit accounts and generates private/public key pair and certificate with unique identity for each node to participate in the network. Once the AC receives a receipt (proof of payment), it updates the relevant nodes' accounts and identifies and revokes the misbehaving nodes.
An on-demand routing protocol, such as dynamic source routing [35] and ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) [36] , is implemented to establish an end-to-end communication session between the source and the destination nodes. The source node's packets may be relayed in several hops by the intermediate nodes to the destination. The network nodes can contact with the AC at least once during a time interval, which can be in the range of a few days. This connection can occur via base stations, Wi-Fi hotspots, or wired networks (e.g., Internet). During this connection, a network node renews or revokes its certificate, submits the payment receipts, and purchases credits by real money.
B. Threat and Trust Models
Since the mobile nodes are autonomous, we assume that an attacker has full control on his mobile node, and thus, he can change its operation and infer the cryptographic data. Attackers can work individually or collude with each other under the control of one attacker to launch sophisticated attacks. Attackers are rational in the sense that they misbehave when they can achieve more benefits than behaving honestly. Specifically, attackers attempt to steal credits, pay less, and communicate freely. The base stations and the mobile nodes are probable attackers because they are motivated to misbehave to increase their welfare. However, the AC is fully trusted because it is impossible to realize secure payment between two entities without a trusted third party [37] . For the trust models, the network nodes fully trust the AC to perform billing and auditing correctly, but the AC trusts no node or base station in the network. 2) Payment; and 3) Redemption. In the Certificate Issuing phase, a customer has to register with the bank to create an account, and the bank issues a short-lifetime certificate, e.g., for 7-10 days. A customer periodically contacts the bank to renew his certificate and pay for the services (packet relay) he received from the merchants. In the Payment phase, a customer's certificate enables him to issue digital receipts to transact with merchants without involving the bank, i.e., customers mine their own electronic coins without the need of direct verification by the bank. In the Redemption phase, a merchant claims its payment by submitting its transactions' receipts. The AC verifies the receipts and clears them by rewarding the merchants and charging the customers. This payment architecture has two important properties that can improve the practical implementation of micropayment in MWNs: no need for TPD and flexible payment.
a) No need for TPD:
The TPD-based incentive systems [22] [23] [24] [25] may not find widespread acceptance for the following reasons. First, the assumption that the TPD cannot be tampered is neither secure nor practical for MWNs. Attackers can communicate freely in an undetectable way if they could compromise the TPDs [38] because the communications are decentralized, and the network nodes are autonomous. Moreover, a small number of trusted manufactures can make the network devices, which is too restrictive for civilian networks. Second, a network node cannot communicate if it does not have sufficient credits. Unfortunately, the nodes at the network edge cannot gain as many credits as the nodes at other locations because they are less frequently selected by the routing protocol. Furthermore, the credit distribution has a direct impact on the network performance, e.g., if a small number of nodes have a large ratio of network credits, the network performance significantly degrades because the rich nodes are not motivated to cooperate, and the poor nodes cannot initiate sessions. Finally, since credits are cleared in real time, the network performance significantly degrades if the network nodes do not have enough credits. Credits are lost normally because the total charges are not necessarily equal to the total rewards [26] , e.g., the source node is charged full payment after sending a packet, but some intermediate nodes might not be rewarded when the route is broken. In [23] , a compensation mechanism is used to change the packet-relaying price proportionally to the nodes' speed to avoid the network credit decline. However, the compensation mechanism has to avoid credit inflation and depletion. For credit inflation, the nodes are rich and thus unmotivated to cooperation, whereas for credit depletion, the nodes are poor and incapable of initiating communication. The design of a decentralized compensation mechanism to stabilize the amount of credits in the network is difficult, particularly in large-scale networks.
In our payment model, the AC can convert credits to real money and sell credits for real money. This motivates the rich nodes to cooperate, enables the nodes that cannot gain credits because they are less frequently selected by the routing protocol to communicate, improves credit distribution, and protects the network from credit decline.
b) Flexible payment: There are two ways to manage electronic payment: online and offline payment. For online payment, a merchant verifies the payment sent by a customer with the bank before serving the customer, and for offline payment, a merchant serves the customer without involving the bank at the transaction time, i.e., instead of interacting with the bank in each transaction, merchants accumulate the payments and redeem them in batch later. The payment management can also be classified into credit (or postpaid) and debit (or prepaid) payment. For credit payment, customers are served first and charged later, e.g., customers issue receipts to the merchants that submit them to the bank to redeem the payment; therefore, a customer's account will not be debited until receipts are processed. For debit payment, the customers' accounts are charged before they are served, e.g., customers buy electronic coins in advance from the bank to pay to the merchants, or the bank has to be interactively involved in each session.
Offline and credit payment are better for the practical implementation of micropayment in MWNs for the following reasons. First, connection with the bank may not be available on a regular basis, and even if it is available, involving a centralized unit in each transaction is very costly and creates bottleneck in the bank due to the high frequency of low-value transactions (P4 and P5 in Table I ). Second, customers generate their own coins (or receipts), which provides many flexibilities. Coins are generated on demand, and customers do not need to frequently contact with the bank to buy coins. In [26] , it is shown that although some nodes have helper credits in CASHnet, they cannot communicate because they could not find a service point to convert the helper credits to traffic credits. Moreover, generating coins to pay for a specific merchant [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] is not practical due to the large number of probable merchants in the network, and generating general coins to pay for any merchant is vulnerable to a double-spending attack or requires interactive and frequent contact with the bank.
Although the developed payment architecture has many positives, it is obvious that reducing the receipts' number is essential for practical implementation for the following reasons. First, since the transactions' number is large and multiple merchants may be involved in a transaction (P1 and P2 in Table I ), generating a receipt per packet or customer increases the receipts' number significantly, and thus, the transaction value may not cover its processing cost (P5 in Table I ) and processing a large number of receipts may not be feasible. Second, the nodes have low resources (P7 in Table I ); therefore, the overhead of storing and submitting a large number of receipts may stimulate the nodes to behave selfishly. What makes it worse is that the nodes keep the receipts for some time because instantaneous contact with the bank may not be guaranteed.
2) Charging and Rewarding Policy: In most existing incentive systems [22] , [23] , [31] [32] [33] , only the source node is charged. We argue that a more fair charging policy is to support cost sharing between the source and the destination nodes because both of them benefit from their communication. The payment ratio is adjustable and can be negotiated during the session establishment phase. To simplify our presentation, we suppose the source and the destination nodes agreed to halve the packet-relaying expense, although any other paymentsplitting ratio can be used. For rewarding policy, some incentive systems [39] , [40] consider a different packet-relaying cost that corresponds to the incurred energy in packet relay. This rewarding policy is difficult to be implemented in practice without involving complicated route-discovery process and calculation of en route individual payments. Therefore, similar to [21] , [23] , [31] , and [33] , we use a fixed rewarding rate, e.g., λ credits per unit-sized packet.
In MWNs, packet loss may occur normally due to node mobility, packet collision, channel impairment, or other reasons. Ideally, any node that has ever tried to forward a packet should be rewarded no matter if the packet eventually reaches its destination or not because forwarding a packet consumes the node's resources. However, it is difficult to corroborate an intermediate forwarding action in a trustable and distributed manner without involving too complicated design. For example, rewarding the nodes for route establishment packets or packet retransmissions complicates the incentive system and increases the receipts' number significantly because a large number of nodes may be involved in relaying route establishment packets, and packet retransmissions frequently happen in wireless networks. Moreover, to reward the nodes for every relayed packet, all the intermediate nodes submit all the receipts to identify the last node that relayed the packet before route breakage [31] [32] [33] .
Therefore, in our incentive system, the first intermediate node after the source node submits the session receipt, and the other intermediate nodes submit the receipts probabilistically to protect against collusion attacks. In Fig. 2(a) , the intermediate nodes are rewarded when the receipt proves that the message has been delivered, i.e., when the first intermediate node after the source node (ID 1 ) receives the message's ACK, or one of the other intermediate nodes receives the ACK and submits the receipt. However, in Fig. 2(a) and (b) , the two communicating nodes are charged when the source node transmits a packet, whether it reaches the destination or not. The value of λ is Fig. 3 . Architecture of our incentive system. determined to compensate the nodes for their consumed resources in route-establishment packets, packet retransmission, and undelivered packets. In Section V, we will argue that our charging and rewarding policy can discourage rational attacks and encourage packet relay. Table II gives the used notations in this paper. 
IV. PIS: THE PROPOSED INCENTIVE SYSTEM
A. Communication Phase 1) Route Discovery:
To establish an end-to-end session, the source node broadcasts the Route Request Packet (RREQ) that contains the identities of the source (ID S ) and the destination (ID D ) nodes, as well as the session establishment time stamp (TS). A network node appends its identity and broadcasts the packet if the TS is within proper range. When the RREQ packet reaches the destination node, it unicasts the Route Reply Packet (RREP) that contains the session nodes' identities (e.g., R = ID S , ID 1 , ID 2 , ID 3 , ID D in the session shown in Fig. 4 ), its certificate, and its signature Sig D (R, TS) for authentication and payment nonrepudiation. After receiving the RREP packet, an intermediate node adds its certificate, signs the packet's signature to authenticate itself, and relays the packet. The source node receives the RREP packet containing the session nodes' identities and authentication code (NAC = Sig 1 (Sig 2 (Sig 3 (Sig D (R, TS)))) in Fig. 4 ). In the first data packet, the source node appends its certificate and the NAC that is used in receipt composition.
2) Data Generation and Relay:
The source node appends its signature (Sig S (R, H(M C ), TS, C)) and the message (M C ) to the Cth data packet in the session and sends the packet to the first node on the route. The source node's signature contains the session nodes' identities (R), the message's hash value (H(M C )), the number of transmitted messages (C), and the session establishment TS. This signature is an approval from one payer to pay for C packets and to ensure the message's authenticity and integrity. Signing H(M C ) instead of M C can reduce the receipt size because a smaller size H(M C ) can be attached to the receipt. As illustrated in Fig. 4 , upon receiving the packet, each intermediate node verifies the source node's signature and updates the session payment proof to contain the last source node's signature that is enough to prove transmitting C packets.
3) ACK Generation and Relay: After receiving the Cth data packet, the destination node sends back signed ACK containing its signature (Sig D (R, TS, C)) as approval to pay for C delivered messages. H(M C ) is not included in the signature in order to avoid increasing the receipt size by attaching both H(M C ) and H(M C−1 ) when the session is broken before receiving the ACK packet. Fig. 4 shows that after receiving the ACK, intermediate nodes update the session payment proof to contain the latest destination node's signature. It can be seen that the payment proof always contains the latest received signatures from the source and the destination nodes.
B. Receipt Submission Phase
For each session, one receipt containing the payment data for all the intermediate nodes can be composed. It can be seen in Fig. 5 that a session receipt contains two main parts: Descriptor and Evidence. The Descriptor contains the payment data, i.e., the identities of the payers and the payees, the messages' number, and the session TS. The Evidence is a security token that prevents payment repudiation and manipulation and thus ensures that the receipt is nondeniable, nonmodifiable, and nonforgeable. The Evidence consists of hashing the session payment proof. Attaching the hash of the payment proof instead of the payment proof can reduce the receipt's size significantly. Fig. 6 shows that different receipts can be aggregated together to a smaller size aggregated receipt. The aggregated receipt contains the descriptors of the individual receipts and Aggregated Evidence, where Descriptor(i) and Evidence(i) refer to the Descriptor and the Evidence of receipt number i, respectively. The Aggregated Evidence is computed by onion hashing the individual receipts' evidences, i.e., H(H(. . . H(H(Evidence(1), Evidence(2)), Evidence (3)), . . .), Evidence(N)). The onionhashing technique enables the nodes to aggregate a newly issued receipt with old aggregated receipts, i.e., receipts are always stored in aggregated format, which can reduce the required storage area to store the receipts.
Since the communication sessions may occur without involving an infrastructure, the intermediate nodes have to submit the receipts to the AC for redemption. It is sufficient to submit one copy of the receipt because it contains payment data for all the intermediate nodes. However, it is not secure to trust one node to submit the receipt because it may collude with the communicating nodes so as not to submit the receipt to increase their welfare. Fig. 7 shows the nodes' charges and rewards for P t delivered packets. If the communicating nodes collude with κ intermediate nodes and the receipt is not submitted, then the colluding nodes can save P t × λ × (n − κ) credits. Obviously, colluders can achieve gains when κ < n, and thus, payers can compensate the colluding intermediate nodes. In this section, we present a reactive receipt submission mechanism to protect against collusion attacks by submitting few redundant receipts. Fig. 8 , the first node after the source node (ID 1 ) is assigned to submit the session receipt and is accused of collusion if it does not submit it; therefore, this node is called assigned submitter or A-submitter. To detect the colluding A-submitter, the other intermediate nodes submit the receipt probabilistically, so they are called probabilistic submitters or P-submitters. The P-submitters' receipt submission probability (P S ) is small so that the colluding A-submitters can be identified by submitting small number of redundant receipts. A colluding A-submitter can be identified once the P-submitter submits the receipt. Equation (1) gives the probability that at least one P-submitter submits the receipt for a session of n intermediate nodes and n C colluding P-submitters, and (2) gives the probability of identifying a colluding A-submitter after unsubmitting γ receipts or the probability that at least one P-submitter submits the receipt in γ sessions.
1) Basic Reactive Receipt Submission Mechanism: In
We define colluder's lifetime (γ L ) as the number of unsubmitted receipts for the probability of identifying the colluding A-submitter to be 0.9. Collusion resistance or the immunity level to collusion attack can be measured by the colluder's lifetime, and the overhead can be measured by the number of redundant receipts, which is proportional to P S . Fig. 9 can clarify an intuitive tradeoff between collusion resistance and overhead, and P S can control this tradeoff. For example, the colluding A-submitter can be identified in shorter time (or fewer γ) with the increase of P S from 0.12 to 0.2, which implies the increase of the redundant receipts' number. The receipt submission probability can be determined to achieve a specific colluder's lifetime, and thus, P S can limit the colluders' gains or the number of unpaid sessions. For example, when n is two in Fig. 9 , the colluder's lifetime can be 10 or 18 by P S to be 0.12 or 0.2, respectively. Fig. 10 shows that choosing a proper value for P S can reduce the overhead and achieve the same γ L . For example, when n is 2, the increase of P S from 0.37 to 0.44 increases the number of redundant receipts but does not improve γ L .
In addition to collusion with an A-submitter, the communicating nodes may collude with some P-submitters to protect the A-submitter. The impact of this collusion is the extension of the A-submitter's lifetime. The effect of collusion with P-submitters on the detection probability of the colluding A-submitter is shown in Fig. 11 . It can be seen that when n C is 1, the colluding A-submitter's lifetime is seven unsubmitted receipts, but when n C is 3 or only one P-submitter is not a colluder, the colluding A-submitter's lifetime increases to 22 unsubmitted receipts. Therefore, the value of P S has to be determined to achieve reasonable worst-case colluder's lifetime when only one P-submitter is not colluder.
2) Enhanced Reactive Receipt Submission Mechanism:
In this section, we discuss two simple modifications to improve our reactive receipt submission mechanism. Fig. 9 shows that the colluder's lifetime depends on the number of intermediate nodes, e.g., at P S to be 0.12, the colluder's lifetimes are 18 and 3.6 unsubmitted receipts for n of 2 and 6, respectively. The mechanism can have close P C (γ) regardless of n by making the receipt submission probability function of n, which we call dynamic P S , i.e., P S should be larger for small n and smaller for large n. One way to implement dynamic PS is to select the value of PS to fix the colluding A-submitter's lifetime, e.g., in Fig. 10 , if γ L of 9 is desired, P S should be 0.05 and 0.23 for n of 6 and 2, respectively. Fig. 12 shows the relation between P C (γ) and γ at different n and with dynamic P S . Comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 12 , dynamic P S can make P C (γ L ) almost identical for different n.
To identify the colluding A-submitter, it is sufficient that one P-submitter submits the receipt. However, in the basic reactive receipt submission mechanism, a receipt may be submitted by more than one P-submitter; therefore, if this receipt submission overlapping is reduced, then the mechanism can be more robust against collusion attack for the same overhead (or the summation of the P-submitters' receipt submission probabilities). Nevertheless, it is not secure to trust one P-submitter because it may collude with the communicating nodes so as not to submit the receipt. One way to reduce the probability of submitting a receipt by more than one P-submitter is by using a weighed P S technique, or one P-submitter called main P-submitter has a higher P S than the other P-submitters. Equation (3) can prove that the weighed P S technique can increase the probability of submitting a receipt without increasing the overhead or i=n i=2 P S (i), where P S (i) is the receipt submission probability for the P-submitter number i on the session. To assign the main P-submitter, a public function called selector function can be used. The input of the function is the session's unique identifier that contains the identities of the nodes on the route (R) and the session establishment TS. The selector function returns the position of the main P-submitter on the route (n S ), where n S ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n} for a session with n intermediate nodes. Obviously, changing the function input can change the position of the main P-submitter, which increases the difficulty of colluding with the main P-submitter. The selector function can be implemented by a hash function, such as SHA-1 [41] , by deriving n S from its output.
To implement the weighted P S technique, the P S of the nonmain P-submitters is P Smin , which can be determined to restrict the colluder's lifetime to γ Lmax in the worst collusion attack, i.e., when only one P-submitter is not colluder. Moreover, the main P-submitter adjusts its P S to achieve a colluder's lifetime of γ Lmin , but P S should not be less than P Smin . This way, if all the P-submitters are honest, then the colluding A-submitter's lifetime is γ Lmin , but it may be extended up to γ Lmax due to the collusion with the P-submitters. The rationale here is that since collusion with one node is more likely or easier than collusion with two or more nodes, the weighted P S technique can improve the robustness against collusion attacks with high probability. In Fig. 13 , each P-submitter's P S is 0.12 in the equal P S technique, and P S is 0.45 and 0.01 for the main P-submitter and the other P-submitters in the weighted P S technique, respectively. It can be seen that by using the weighted P S technique, the colluding A-submitter can be identified after unsubmitting a smaller number of receipts for the same i=n i=2 P S (i) due to decreasing the probability of submitting a receipt by more than one P-submitter.
C. Payment Redemption and Colluder Identification Phase
The network nodes periodically submit the receipts to the AC to redeem them. Once the AC receives a receipt, it first checks if the receipt has been deposited before using its unique identifier (R, TS). Then, to verify the receipt's credibility, the AC generates the session payment proof and hashes it and compares the resultant hash value with the receipt's Evidence. If the A-submitter does not submit the receipt but the P-submitter does, then the A-submitter is identified as colluder and excluded from the network by denying update of its certificate. Finally, the AC clears the receipt according to the rewarding and charging policy discussed in Section III-C2.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our security objective is to prevent misbehaving nodes from achieving gains such as stealing credits or paying less. In our incentive system, the charges and rewards are based on receipts submitted by rational nodes, so a node or even a group of colluding nodes may attempt to cheat the system to increase their welfare. For Double Clearance attack, the attacker attempts to clear a receipt multiple times to increase its rewards. The AC can thwart the attack and identify the attacker because each receipt has a unique identifier. For Double Spending attack, the attackers attempt to generate identical receipts for different sessions to pay once. In our incentive system, even if attackers establish different sessions at the same time, the receipts' identifiers are different because at least one intermediate node is different. For Receipt Forgery or Manipulation attack, the attackers attempt to forge receipts or manipulate valid receipts to increase their rewards. This is almost impossible in our incentive system due to the difficulties of forging or modifying the payers' signatures, computing the private keys from the public ones, and computing the hash of the signatures without computing the signatures. Moreover, if an attacker attaches a random value for a receipt's Evidence, the probability to hit the correct value is extremely low, e.g., this probability is 6.84 × 10 −49 by using SHA-1 [41] with digest value of 20 B, the AC can identify the attackers because their receipts' verifications fail.
For Free Calling (or Riding) attacks, the attackers attempt to communicate freely. Two colluding intermediate nodes on a legitimate session may manipulate the session packets to add their data. If the intermediate nodes cannot verify the payment data, then the source node may transmit packets with invalid payment data. Internal and external attackers may record valid packets and replay them in a different place and/or time, claiming that they are fresh to establish sessions under the names of others. For Message and Payment Repudiation attacks, the attacker attempts to deny initiating a session or the payment in order to not pay. To thwart these attacks, the communicating nodes' signatures can prevent the denial and the manipulation of the messages and the payment. The intermediate nodes verify the communicating nodes' signatures to verify the message integrity and authenticity, as well as the payment data. Moreover, an RREQ packet is dropped if the TS is not within a proper range to thwart Packet-Replay attack.
For Fake A-submitter attack, the communicating nodes attempt to insert a nonexisting A-submitter on the route to communicate freely because the fake A-submitter does not submit the receipt. In addition, this A-submitter may be accused of collusion. To thwart this attack and other attacks [42] outside the scope of this paper, the session nodes authenticate themselves in the route discovery phase, and the NAC is included in the receipt's Evidence. For Credit Collecting attack, some nodes may insert nonexistent neighbors to collect credits for them without participation in packet relay. This attack is a type of the known routing attack called Route Lengthening. First, the colluding nodes have to exchange their private keys because authentication is needed in our incentive system, which may discourage the attack because colluders can steal the credits of each other or commit malicious actions under their names. Second, the attack does not always work because it may lead to suboptimal route due to the preference of shortest routes. Third, the AC can identify the attackers when it observes that some nodes appear in different locations at the same time. Finally, the proposed solutions for secure routing protocols such as ARAN [43] and Ariadne [44] can be implemented in our incentive system. For Destination Node's Robbery attack, the source node colludes with some intermediate nodes to steal credits from the destination node by sending bogus data to the destination. In our incentive system, the intermediate nodes are rewarded only when the destination node acknowledges receiving correct data, and a receipt cannot be composed if the destination node is not interested in the communication because its signature is required in the receipt composition.
For our reactive receipt submission mechanism, the colluding A-submitter can be identified once the P-submitter submits the receipt, and the colluders cannot know whether the P-submitter is going to submit the receipt or not because the P-submitters decide submitting the receipts independently. Moreover, the receipt submission probability can restrict the number of unsubmitted receipts or colluders' gains. The AC can identify the colluding or uncooperative P-submitters that do not submit the receipts by comparing their receipt submission ratios with P S . For Reduced Payment Receipt attack, the colluding A-submitter submits the session receipt but with less payment. The AC can identify the colluding A-submitter by matching the payment in its receipt with that in the P-submitter's receipt. In this case, the P-submitter cannot be the attacker because it is difficult to manipulate the receipt's Evidence to increase the payment.
In our payment model, the communicating nodes can communicate even if they do not have sufficient credits; therefore, to limit overspending, the certificates' lifetime is short, and the lifetime can depend on the node's available credits and its average credit consumption rate. As the network nodes are rational, without proper charging and rewarding policy, they may try to cheat to increase their welfare. Our charging and rewarding policy has been developed to counteract rational cheating actions and encourage the nodes' cooperation.
Particularly, a rational node can exhibit one of the following actions.
1) To increase their rewards with consuming low resources, a node may compose the receipt but does not forward the message, or a group of colluding nodes may forward only the receipt instead of the message because submitting a receipt to the AC is sufficient to earn credits. In our payment model, the nodes are motivated to relay the messages because they are rewarded only when the destination node acknowledges receiving the messages. 2) The destination node receives a message, but it does not send ACK in order to not pay. To prevent this, both the source and the destination nodes are charged for undelivered messages.
3) The A-submitter colludes with the communicating nodes and claims that a message does not reach the destination node to increase their welfare. In our payment model, the communicating nodes are charged for undelivered messages.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Using public key cryptography for cooperation stimulation is necessary to prevent the communicating nodes from denying the payment and to enable the intermediate nodes to verify the payment. Digital signature technology and hardware implementation have improved, and fast signature schemes are currently available. For example, "online/offline" digital signature [45] is computed in two steps: An offline step that is computationally more demanding and independent of the message is performed before the message to be signed is available; and a lightweight online step is performed once the message to be signed becomes available. Moreover, field-programmable gate array implementation of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) signature scheme can perform the signing and verifying operations in several milliseconds [46] . In addition, instead of generating an ACK per message, ACK can be generated for a number of messages to reduce the number of digital signature operations, and to reduce the end-to-end delay, the destination node can generate its signature before receiving a message because the message is not included in its signature. Moreover, the end-to-end delay can be reduced by delayed verification, where a node forwards the packet before verifying the signature.
Due to the high frequency of low-value transactions, reducing the receipts' number is essential for practical implementation of an incentive system to avoid making a bottleneck in the AC and to reduce storage, submission, and process overheads. In this section, simulations are performed to evaluate the expected reduction of the receipts' number in our incentive system, compared with the existing systems.
A. Simulation Setup
MATLAB is used to simulate MWN by randomly deploying 35 mobile nodes with 125-m transmission range in a square cell of 1000 m × 1000 m. The constant bit rate traffic source is implemented in each node as an application layer, and the TABLE III  STATISTICS OF THE SIMULATED NETWORK   TABLE IV  AVERAGE RECEIPT SIZE (IN BYTES) source and destination pairs are chosen randomly. To emulate node mobility, we adopt the modified random waypoint model [47] . Specifically, a node travels toward a random destination uniformly selected within the network field; upon reaching the destination, it pauses for some time, and the process repeats itself afterward. A node's speed is uniformly distributed from the range [0, 3] m/s, and the pause time is 20 s. We simulate the AODV routing protocol [36] over an ideal and contention-free channel, i.e., all the nodes within transmission range receive packet transmission correctly. The TS, node's identity (ID i ), and message number (C) are 5, 4, and 2 B, respectively. The simulation results are averaged over 400 runs. MATLAB is used instead of network simulator such as NS2 because the intention is to compare the receipts' overhead of our incentive system with the existing systems. The effect of the unsimulated models, such as nonideal channel, channel contention, node buffer, etc., should be the same on all the systems.
In Table III , statistics about route length and connectivity in our simulated network are given. P(R L ≤ 4) is the probability that a route has four nodes or fewer, including the source and the destination nodes. The network connectivity is the ratio of the connected routes to the total number of possible routes, assuming any two nodes are the source and destination pair. The statistics show that our simulated network is well connected and that the route length is acceptable.
B. Simulation Results
1) Average Receipt Size:
Using 1024-bit RSA signature scheme and SHA-1 hash function with digest width of 20 B [41] , the average receipt size is given in Table IV . It can be seen that the receipt sizes in DSC and our incentive system are much smaller than that in Sprite and Express due to hashing the signatures. The receipt size in DSC is larger than that in PIS due to attaching the root and the last released hash value of the hash chain. For PIS and DSC, a 1-MB storage area can store up to 17 476.27 and 10 699.76 receipts, respectively.
2) Effectiveness of Receipt Aggregation Technique: Fig. 14 shows the relation between the receipts' number and their average storage area. Without receipt aggregation, PIS requires less storage area than DSC due to reducing the receipt size, and the receipt aggregation technique can reduce the storage area effectively, e.g., 150 receipts require average storage areas of 14.36, 8.79, and 5.8 kB in DSC and PIS without and with receipt aggregation, respectively. 3) Number of Generated Receipts: Table V shows the number of generated receipts for 10-min data transmission at different packet-transmission rates and node speed. During the transmission, a new session is established each time the route is broken. It can be seen that Sprite and Express generate a large number of receipts due to generating a receipt per packet, and the increase of packet-transmission rate increases the receipts' number significantly due to increasing the number of transmitted packets. Moreover, there is no effect to the nodes' speed on the receipts' number because receipts are generated for transmitted packets, regardless of whether they reach the destinations or not.
For DSC, a receipt is generated when a route is broken or S packets are transmitted, where S is the hash chain size, but a receipt is generated only when a route is broken in PIS. Table V indicates that more receipts are generated at high node mobility in DSC and PIS because the routes are more frequently broken, i.e., the data are transmitted over a larger number of routes. In PIS, the packet transmission rate has little effect on the receipts' number because one fixed-size receipt is generated per session (or route), regardless of the transmitted packets' number.
For DSC, fewer receipts may be generated with the increase of S because a receipt can contain payment data for more packets. The increase of S from 11 to 22 can halve the receipts' number, but the increase from 22 to 33 reduces the receipts' number less because the routes are broken before releasing all the elements in the hash chain. When a route is broken, the unused hash values of the hash chain should not be used for other routes to secure the payment. Moreover, it is difficult to compute an optimal value for S due to the difficulty of estimating the number of transmitted packets before the route is broken. Consequently, to reduce the receipts' number in DSC, each node has to compute and store a large number of long hash chains. In other words, DSC can reduce the ACK packets' processing overhead by replacing the destination's signatures with hashing operations but at the expense of increasing the receipts' size and number. Certainly, more receipts are generated by considering the effect of the nonideal channel, but our incentive system still generates fewer receipts compared with the existing systems because the nonideal channel has a similar effect on all the systems.
4) Number of Submitted Receipts:
To compare our receiptsubmission mechanism with the existing mechanisms, we assume that the receipts' number is 100 and that the number of intermediate nodes is 5. For the Preventive mechanism, the number of submitted receipts by each node is 59 to secure the mechanism up to two colluders, i.e., to guarantee that the probability of submitting at least 90% of the receipts is at least 0.9 under two colluders. For the Reactive mechanism, P S is 0.038 and 0.075 to guarantee that γ L ≤ 20 and γ L ≤ 10 in case of two colluders, respectively. Moreover, in our evaluation, we consider the following two metrics. The security metric (Q) is the robustness against collusion attack measured by the number of submitted receipts under collusion attack, which is related to the colluder's lifetime in PIS. The efficiency metric (T) is the number of generated receipts to the submitted receipts in normal (no collusion) case, where T ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal value for T is one when there is no submission to redundant receipts. From (4), the value of T in PIS depends on the receiptsubmission probability and the number of intermediate nodes. Fig. 15 shows that the increase of P S degrades the efficiency in our receipt submission mechanism but decreases the colluding A-submitter's lifetime, as indicated in Fig. 10 . A proper value for P S can reduce the number of redundant receipts and restrict the colluders' gains. The value of P S should depend on the likelihood or the easiness of attacking the incentive system, e.g., the easiness of obtaining multiple identities and compromising a device. In addition, the AC can change the value of P S   TABLE VI  EVALUATION OF RECEIPT SUBMISSION MECHANISMS periodically, according to the security situation in the network, e.g., P S can be increased when discovering many collusion attacks in the network.
From Table VI , the One-Submitter mechanism can achieve the highest efficiency (T = 1) because each receipt is submitted once, i.e., there is no redundant receipts, but the mechanism is vulnerable to collusion attack because if one node colludes (Co = 1), all the receipts are not submitted (Q = 0) without identifying the colluding nodes. The All-Submitter mechanism is not vulnerable to collusion attacks, but it is not efficient because six and seven copies of each receipt are submitted in Sprite and Express, respectively.
For the Preventive mechanism, if all the nodes are honest (Co = 0), the probability to submit 97 receipts is 0.97; therefore, in the Reactive mechanism, receipts are not submitted in exceptional cases (collusion), but in the Preventive mechanism, the unchosen receipts are not submitted normally in the dominant noncollusion condition. In the Preventive mechanism, it may be difficult to identify the colluders that reduce the number of unrepeated receipts by submitting the same receipts. At three colluders, the probability to submit at least 78 receipts is 0.93, but the colluder's lifetime is 30 and 15 for P S to be 0.038 and 0.075, respectively; therefore, the Preventive mechanism can protect the network effectively when collusion attacks are very common and extensive, which contradicts property P6 in Table I . For efficiency, the Reactive mechanism can reduce the redundant receipts' number significantly compared with the Preventive mechanism. Only 15.2 and 37.5 redundant receipts are submitted for P S to be 0.038 and 0.075, respectively, but for the Preventive mechanism, 195 redundant receipts are submitted because each node has to submit a large number of receipts to guarantee submitting most of the receipts in case of no collusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an incentive system to stimulate the nodes' cooperation in MWNs. The payment model has been developed to implement micropayment for cooperation stimulation efficiently. Reducing the overhead of the payment receipts is necessary for the practical implementation of an incentive system due to the high frequency of low-value transactions. Therefore, one fixed-size receipt is generated per session, regardless of the packets' number. Attaching the hash of the signatures instead of the signatures can reduce the receipt size significantly, and the receipt-aggregation technique has been used to generate a smaller size receipt for multiple sessions. In addition, the reactive receipt submission mechanism has been proposed to reduce the number of submitted receipts and protect against collusion attacks by a small number of redundant receipts with limiting the colluders' gains probabilistically. Our analysis and simulations demonstrate that the proposed incentive system can secure the payment and significantly reduce the receipts' storage area and the number of generated and submitted receipts.
